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The Presumption of Due Care in
Wrongful Death Actions in
Pennsylvania: Has It Outlived Its
Useful Life?
I. Introduction
Pennsylvania statutorily created a cause of action for wrongful
death in 1851.' In all such wrongful death actions, a presumption
arises that the plaintiff's decedent was exercising due care at the time
of the fatal accident.2 Pennsylvania courts created this presumption3
in an attempt to thwart the harshness of the contributory negligence
doctrine.4 Every state possesses similar wrongful death legislation5
I. The death action did not exist in Pennsylvania prior to the passage of legislation in
1851, which states, in part, the following:
(a) General rule.-An action may be brought to recover damages for the death of
an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negli-
gence of another if no action for damages was brought by the injured individual
during his lifetime.
Act of April 15, 1851, P.L. No. 669 (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon
1981)).
2. Eg., Keasey v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 404 Pa. 63, 69, 170 A.2d 328, 331 (1961);
Moore v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 364 Pa. 343, 345, 72 A.2d 117, 119 (1950), ag on opinion of
lowercourt; Roweles v. Evanuik, 350 Pa. 64, 69, 38 A.2d 255, 257 (1944); Morin v. Kreidt, 310
Pa. 90, 97, 164 A. 799, 800 (1933).
3. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text infra.
4. See note 90 .fra
5. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1977); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-611 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-906 (1979); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377
(Deering Supp. 1981); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555
(Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3704 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.19 (West Supp.
1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1301-06 (Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (Supp. 1975);
IDAHO CODE §§ 5-310, 5-311 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § I (Smith Hurd 1981); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE § 633.336 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1901 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (Baldwin 1969); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315
(West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-901 to 3-904 (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, §§ 1-2 (West Supp. 1981); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS § 27A.2922 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.070 (Vernon 1953); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 512-513 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556.12 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1952); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-2-3 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Baldwin 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West Supp. 1981);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1970); S.C. CODE § 15-51-10 (1977);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-11-6 to 11-7 (1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1974); VA. CODE § 8.01-50 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
and many have also developed a presumption of due care.6 The pre-
sumption, however, has presented continuing problems in Penn-
sylvania7 and other states,' and Pennsylvania courts now question
whether the presumption should still exist.9
The problems have arisen in part because the concept of pre-
sumptions has baffled courts for years.'0 One writer appropriately
labeled a presumption as "the slipperiest member of the family of
legal terms."t" Scholars have advanced different theories for the cre-
ation and proper function of presumptions.' 2 This comment exam-
ines the differing views and their effect when courts apply one or
several of these theories.'
3
The presumption of due care in Pennsylvania developed soon
after the passage of the wrongful death legislation. 4 An analysis of
the history of the presumption reveals inconsistent judicial applica-
tion of the presumption.' 5 Courts originally considered the pre-
sumption probative evidence in a plaintiff's case. 16 Recently, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court expressed the opposite view and sug-
gested that the presumption no longer served a useful purpose."
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts continue to consider and to apply
the presumption of due care.' 8
§ 4.20.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 1966); Wvo.
STAT. § 1-38-101 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Davis v. Boggs, 22 Ariz. 497, 199 P. 116 (1921); Graves v. Northern P. Ry.,
30 Idaho 542, 166 P. 571 (1917); Goffv. St. Louis Transit Co., 199 Mo. 694, 98 S.W. 49 (1906);
Sweeo v. Chicago & North W. Ry., 183 Wis. 234, 197 N.W. 805 (1924).
7. See notes 126-179 and accompanying text infra.
8. Several jurisdictions have recognized that the presumption of due care often casts a
prejudicial burden on the defendant in a wrongful death action. See, e.g., Jurman v. Braen,
Inc., 47 N.J. 586, 222 A.2d 78 (1966); Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wash. 2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
9. In Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 435 A.2d 226 (1981), the superior court
stated, "The requirement that a jury be instructed concerning this presumption of due care
may well have outlived its usefulness." Id at -, 435 A.2d at 230.
10. One writer aptly described the situation as follows: "Every writer of sufficient intelli-
gence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presump-
tions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair." Morgan,
Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255, 255 (1937).
11. McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden ofProof, 5 N.C.L. REV. 291, 295
(1927). When the writer called the presumption the "slipperiest member," however, he con-
ceded that the presumption's "first cousin," the burden of proof, might be an exception to his
statement. Id
12. See notes 56-72 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra.
14. The first decision implicitly recognizing the presumption that the decedent exercised
due care appeared in 1864, only thirteen years after the wrongful death legislation was passed.
Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Hagan, 47 Pa. 244 (1864).
15. See notes 123-125 and accompanying text infra
16. Holzheimer v. Lit Bros., 262 Pa. 150, 152, 105 A. 73, 74 (1918).
17. Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, - 435 A.2d 226, 230 (1981). See note 9
supra.
18. The court in Yandrich held that the presumption has no probative value and there-
fore the trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury that the presumption was not evidence
and could not take the place of evidence. Id at -, 435 A.2d at 230. Since the court only
suggested the presumption has outlived its usefulness, the presumption of due care remains
law in Pennsylvania. Id at -, 435 A.2d at 229.
Critics of the presumption contend that it casts a prejudicial
burden on the defendant 9 and, at a minimum, confuses the jury.
20
Also, several courts have suggested that the adoption of comparative
negligence eliminates the need for the presumption.2' Pennsylvania
courts can choose from several options to resolve or reduce confu-
sion.22 This comment offers criticisms of those options2 3 and sug-
gests which option would produce maximum certainty and
consistency.
II. Confusion Surrounding Presumptions
Presumptions continually perplex both courts and writers24, and
accordingly, extensive materials on the subject of presumptions
abound.25 One general definition of a presumption, which has
evolved from the commentary, provides that when a basic fact ex-
ists26 the law presumes a second fact exists in the absence of ade-
quate proof of the nonexistence of the second fact.27
Much confusion stems, however, from indiscriminate judicial
and scholarly usage of the term "presumption" as a vehicle for a
19. See notes 126-155 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 156-164 and accompanying text infra,
21. See, e.g., notes 165-175 and accompanying text infra, describing the effect of the pre-
sumption of due care on a jury's verdict since the advent of comparative negligence.
22. See notes 180-184 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 185-203 and accompanying text infra
24. See Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 500, 173 A. 644, 649 (1934); Tyrrell
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 109 Vt. 9, -, 192 A. 184, 191 (1937). One writer referred to
judicial analysis on presumptions as "a welter of loose language and discordant decisions."
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906 (1931).
25. For some of the leading commentaries on presumptions, see J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW (1947); J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVI-
DENCE (1898); IX J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2490-2493 (Chadburn rev. 1981);
Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REV. 71 (1940); Levin, Pennsylvania and the
Unform Rules of Evidence." Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1954);
McBaine, Presumptions.- Are They Evidence?, 26 CAL. L. REV. 519 (1938); McCormick, supra
note 11; McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions, 13 WASH.
L. REV. 185.(1938); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245
(1943) [hereinafter cited as Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions]; Morgan, In-
structing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1933) [herein-
after cited as Morgan, Instructing the Jury]; Morgan supra note 24.
See also TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, -, 53 N.W.2d 468, 470 (1952). For a thorough
analysis of the confusion surrounding presumptions, see Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting Presump-
tions.- Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. REV. 527 (1978).
26. The relation between the basic fact and the presumed fact bears no significance un-
less the basic fact is established. Several ways to establish the basic fact exist: (1) the court
may judicially note that the basic fact exists; (2) the parties, by pleadings or by stipulation,
may agree that the basic fact exists; (3) the evidence may reach such a level of credibility and
quantity that a reasonable trier of fact must find its existence; and (4) the trier of fact may find
the existence of the basic fact if substantial evidence exists to support the finding. Morgan,
Further Observations on Presumptions, supra note 25, at 245.
27. J. MAGUIRE, supra note 25, at 183. Morgan has defined a presumption as follows:
"When A is established the trier of fact must assume that B exists unless or until a specified
condition has been fulfilled." Morgan, Presumptions:. Their Nature, Purpose and Reason, 2
BRANDEIS LAW. Soc'y. 3-4 (1949); Levin, supra note 25, at 11.
multitude of substantive laws and policies." This overuse of the
term mandates distinguishing the actual presumption 29 from the
many diverse "presumptions."3 To clarify the confusion, writers
often distinguish presumptions of law from presumptions of fact.3'
A presumption of law compels the jury to reach a specified conclu-
sion in the absence of adequate rebuttal.3 2 This presumption repre-
sents a legal conclusion on the existence of a presumed fact, based on
the existence of the basic fact, and binds the jury.13 So defined, the
presumption of law comports with the central meaning of the term
presumption.
A presumption in fact, however, merely permits the jury to de-
clare the existence of the presumed fact from the existence of another
fact.3 4 The presumption of fact lacks the legal consequences integral
to a presumption 35 and its effectiveness depends on the inherent like-
lihood that the fact will convince the jury.36 Thus, the presumption
of fact is, in reality, only a permissible inference and should not be
labeled a presumption.37
Difficulty arises in distinguishing presumptions of law from pre-
sumptions of fact because courts often create a presumption of law
by attaching the legal consequences of a presumption to a permissi-
ble inference with strong probability.38 The lack of these legal con-
sequences for a presumption of fact, however, makes the distinction
28. Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 25, at 527. One writer asserted that the term has become
devoid of meaning because of its "promiscuous use." Laughlin, In Support of The Thayer
Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195, 195 (1953). This writer listed and discussed
eight diverse senses in which the courts and writers used the word "presumption." Id
29. The true presumption encompasses the rebuttal presumption or the presumption of
law. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, supra note 25, at 246-47. See notes 32 &
33 and accompanying text infra, and notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra.
30. The large number of diverse presumptions has created immense confusion. One
writer complained, "Corpus Juris Secundum listed 113 so-called presumptions. In addition,
cross references are made to other special subjects." Laughlin, supra note 28, at 195. See also
Comment, The Procedural Effect of a Rebuttable Presumption of Law, 23 U. PITr. L. REV. 685,
685 (1962).
31. In essence, the distinction between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact
represents the difference between real presumptions and "things that are not presumptions at
all." J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 304.
32. Id at 305; Comment, supra note 30, at 686.
33. WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 304.
34. Morgan succinctly depicted the presumption of fact in the following manner: "if A is
given, the trier of fact may find B." Morgan, supra note 10, at 256.
35. The presumption of law represents not the fact itself nor the inference itself, but the
legal consequences attached to it. A presumption in fact does not have any legal conse-
quences. With no rule of law attached to the presumption of fact, the jury may give this
presumption whatever force or weight it thinks best. J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 304.
36. Id
37. Referring to the presumption of fact, Wigmore wrote, "So long as the law attaches no
legal consequences in the way of a duty upon the opponent to come forward with contrary
evidence, there is no propriety in applying the term 'presumption' to such facts, however great
their probative significance." Id
38. An example of a presumption of law attached to a permissible inference is the follow-
ing: if,, properly and legibly addresses, stamps, and mails a letter to B, the law presumes that
B received that letter. Furthermore, because of the fair dependability of the United States
between the two presumptions crucial. A drastic difference exists be-
tween instructing a jury that it may find a fact exists and telling the
jury it must find the fact exists unless the defendant fulfills a
condition.39
In a further attempt to clarify the confusion, writers sometimes
designate presumptions of law as either rebuttable or conclusive.'
A rebuttable presumption correctly requires the jury to assume the
existence of the presumed fact until the opponent of the presumption
fulfills certain specified conditions.4 A conclusive presumption, on
the other hand, requires the jury to accept the presumed fact regard-
less of the evidence.42 Conclusive presumptions do not comply with
the general definition of a presumption but rather, as one writer has
suggested, constitute mislabeled substantive laws.43
A. Theories Concerning the Creation and Function of Presumptions
Presumptions originated for several reasons.44 One commenta-
tor has described presumptions as tools for rationalization and argu-
mentation. 45  Accordingly, courts create presumptions to reflect
general experience and probability, or mere policy and conven-
ience.' Another commentator has suggested seven underlying pur-
poses for the development of presumptions.47 In general, procedural
convenience is recognized as an important reason for presump-
Postal Service, a logical inference exists that the letter reached its destination. Hecht & Pin-
zler, supra note 25, at 528.
39. The difference between the two kinds of presumptions exists because of the addi-
tional force the presumption of law carries. "A rule of presumption does not merely say that
such and such is a permissible and usual inference from other facts. . . . It goes on to say that
this inference shall always, in the absence of other circumstances, be imputed to them."
Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REv. 324, 327 (1952). See also J.
THAYER, supra note 25, at 317.
40. Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 25, at 529.
41. See note 27 and accompanying text supra
42. J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 308.
43. The conclusive presumption provides that when the basic fact exists, the existence of
the second or presumed facts is wholly immaterial. This provision makes the presumption a
rule of law that entirely removes the issue from consideration. Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 25,
at 529; J. WiOMORE, supra note 25, at 308. Morgan used the rule of adverse possession to
illustrate a conclusive presumption. Specifically, twenty years of adverse possession of a tract
of land raises the conclusive presumption of a lost grant to the possessor. Morgan, upra note
10, at 255.
44. See, e.g., J. THAYER, supra note 25, at 314; Morgan, supra note 10, at 257-59;
Gausewitz, supra note 39, at 329.
45. J. THAYER, supra note 25, at 314.
46. Id
47. Morgan listed seven purposes that lead to the development of presumptions: (1) to
expedite the trial by relieving a party from the burden of introducing evidence on an issue that
may not be litigated; (2) to avoid a procedural impasse; (3) to add legal consequences to a
strong probability; (4) to avoid an impasse due to difficulty in securing legally competent evi-
dence; (5) to place the burden of producing evidence on a party that has peculiar means of
access to the evidence or peculiar knowledge of the facts; (6) to express a socially desirable
policy; (7) to encompass two or more of the foregoing. Morgan, supra note 10, at 257-59.
tions.48 For example, a court may design a presumption to expedite
a trial by relieving a party of the burden of producing evidence upon
issues the parties normally would not litigate.49 Commentators also
list judicial recognition of certain high probabilities as an underlying
purpose.5 0 Thus, when common experience shows the fact usually
exists, the court will compel the trier of fact to assume the usual does
indeed exist.5'
Scholars have also offered different theories for the function of
presumptions. Generally, a presumption serves to shift the burden
of proof to the opponent of the presumption.5 2 The term burden of
proof, however, incorporates two separate. concepts 53-- the burden of
production54 and the burden of persuasion. 5 Commentators disa-
gree whether a presumption shifts only the burden of production or
the burden of persuasion as well.
5 6
One theory, the Thayer doctrine, 57 contends that the essential
role of a presumption should consist solely of fixing the burden of
production on the opponent of the presumption.5" Under this the-
ory, when the opponent of a presumption comes forward with evi-
dence against the presumed fact, the presumption vanishes.5 9 The
Thayer doctrine, sometimes referred to as the "bursting bubble the-
ory,"60 affords a presumption little weight since introduction of any
48. Id See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
49. The criminal law presumption of sanity developed to facilitate speedy trials. Because
the courts recognize a presumption that the defendant is sane, the defendant bears the burden
of producing evidence on insanity. Efficiency and common sense prevent compelling the pros-
ecutor to produce evidence of the sanity of a defendant who may decide not to enter testimony
of insanity. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, supra note 25, at 251.
50. See note 47 supra. See also note 44 and accompanying text supra.
51. See note 38 supra for another example of a presumption created because of
probability. See also note 99 and accompanying text infra, which describe the presumption of
due care.
52. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 300 (01) (1980).
53. Comment, supra note 30, at 686.
54. The burden of production, also referred to as the burden of coming forward with
evidence, defines the obligation of a party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a directed
verdict or an adverse preemptory finding on a material issue of fact. UNIFORM RULE OF Evi-
DENCE 1(5) (1953); J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2485, at 284.
55. The burden of persuasion, sometimes referred to as the risk of nonpersuasion, defines
the obligation of a party to meet the requirements of a rule of law that the fact be proved either
by a preponderance of the evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reason-
able doubt, as the case may be. UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 1(4) (1953); J. WIGMORE, supra
note 25, § 2485, at 284.
56. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 52.
57. Writers and courts commonly call this school of thought the "Thayer doctrine" be-
cause Thayer was its initial advocate. J. THAYER, supra note 25.
58. J. THAYER, supra note 25, at 337.
59. Id
60. J. WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 309. Courts and writers often use colloquial phrases to
show the flimsy and insubstantial nature of a presumption. Wyckoffv. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 173 Ore. 592, 597, 147 P.2d 227, 229-30 (1944). See, e.g., Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable
Presumptions ofLaw Upon the Burden ofProof 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307, 314 (1920), in which
Bohlen described presumptions as "like Maeterlinck's male bee, having functioned they
disappear."
rebuttal evidence destroys the presumption.6'
A second theory urges different treatments for various presump-
tions. 62 Whether a presumption shifts one or both burdens of proof
depends on the purpose which led to the recognition of that particu-
lar presumption.63 Critics of this theory have attacked it as
impractical."
A third theory, the Pennsylvania rule,65 suggests that a pre-
sumption should shift both burdens of proof to the opponent of the
presumption.66 After the United States Supreme Court found this
theory unconstitutional as applied when the presumption does not
develop from an underlying probability,67 the advocates of this the-
ory showed a willingness to compromise or qualify the theory.
68
Currently, under the Pennsylvania rule, a presumption carries suffi-
cient weight to shift both burdens of proof only if the basic fact pos-
sesses probative value.69
An early view of the function of presumptions accorded them
the same weight as evidence.70 This theory places an extremely dif-
ferent function on a presumption than does the Thayer doctrine.7 A
common criticism of this view, however, focuses on the inability of
the jury to weigh a presumption with other evidence.72
61. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 52; Comment, supra note 30, at 689.
62. Referring to presumptions that should shift both the burdens of production and per-
suasion, the first advocate of this theory stated, "[l]he important thing is to recognize that such
presumptions do exist and to discover the reasons for their existence and effect, instead of
dismissing them as mere interlopers into the law of evidence and as such unworthy of serious
consideration." Bohlen, supra note 60, at 309.
63. Id, see Comment, supra note 30, at 689.
64. Theoretically, treating presumptions differently is sound, but it would require a dif-
ferent rule for each class of presumptions. Therefore, the theory presents difficulty in adminis-
tration, comprehension, and uniformity. Gausewitz, supra note 39, at 330.
65. The rule obtained recognition as "the Pennsylvania rule" because writers and courts
once believed that it was accepted doctrine in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa.
182, 112 A. 528 (1921); E. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 36 (1961).
66. Morgan, chief advocate of the Pennsylvania rule, criticized the Thayer doctrine be-
cause it allowed a presumption to vanish too easily. He thought it was ridiculous to allow a
valuable presumption to be destroyed by the introduction of evidence that lacked persuasive
effect. Morgan, Instructing the Jury, supra note 25, at 82.
67. The Court held that a statute which shifted the burden of persuasion was unconstitu-
tional if the basic fact carried no probative value as evidence of the presumed fact. Western &
At. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
68. The willingness to compromise took form at American Law Institute proceedings in
1939 for the Model Code of Evidence. Morgan, the chief advocate of this theory, submitted a
proposal that called for use of the Pennsylvania rule when the basic fact has any probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact. Comment, supra note 30, at 691. For a thorough
analysis of these proceedings, see Helman, Presumptions, 22 CAN. B. REV. 118, 128-36 (1944).
69. Comment, supra note 30, at 691.
70. Morgan, supra note 10, at 265. For example, California courts treated presumptions
as evidence because of the rule of Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 P. 529 (1931).
The California legislature repudiated this rule in 1965. CAL. EVID. CODE § 600 (West 1966).
71. One court described the contrast between treating presumptions as evidence and ap-
plying the Thayer doctrine as a full cycle. Klink v. Harrison, 332 F.2d 219, 228 (3d Cir. 1964)
(analyzing the presumption of due care in Pennsylvania).
72. Morgan, Instructing the Jury, supra note 25, at 73.
In practice, courts often apply a theoretical hybrid," usually
while voicing adherence to one theory.74 For example, courts apply-
ing the "modified bursting bubble theory"75 require the opponent to
rebut a presumption with credible evidence and allow the jury to
decide if this evidence overcomes the presumption.76 One writer has
catalogued eight different variations now applied in courtrooms."
Obviously, the numerous theories and the even more numerous ap-
plications of those theories make Judge Learned Hand's words still
applicable: "Judges have mixed it up until nobody can tell what on
earth it means and the important thing is to get something which is
workable and which can be understood and I don't much care what
it is."'78 These words precisely describe the status of the presumption
of due care and its effects.
B. The Presumption of Due Care-An Analysis of Procedural
Effects
The presumption of due care provides that if a decedent dies
79
in or as a result of an accident from which a wrongful death action
arises, 0 the jury must assume the decedent was exercising due care
unless contrary evidence rebuts the decedent's due care.8 Courts
created the presumption for several reasons, including the natural
probability of a person to avoid death 2 and the inability of the
plaintiff to secure evidence because of the decedent's inability to
speak.
3
Disregarding the particular reasons that fostered the develop-
ment of the concept, the presumption places a burden on the defend-
ant to rebut. In a jurisdiction where the plaintiff bears the burden of
73. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 52.
74. Many courts, while adhering to the Thayer doctrine, disagree concerning the amount
of evidence necessary to destroy the presumption. Therefore, courts create a variable rule by
adjusting the quantum of evidence required to rebut a given presumption. Id at § 300(02).
75. Comment, The Treatment of Presumptions in Ilinois. Adding Insult to lnjury?, 27
DEPAUL L. REv. 793, 799 (1978).
76. Id at 801.
77. E. MORGAN, supra note 65, at 36.
78. 18 American Law Institute Proceedings 217-18 (1941).
79. Courts have sometimes extended the presumption of due care to cases in which the
accident renders the victim mentally incompetent or induces memory loss. See, e.g., Kmetz v.
Luchialto, 421 Pa. 363, 366-67, 219 A.2d 588, 589-90 (1966); Auel v. White, 389 Pa. 208, 214,
132 A.2d 350, 353 (1957).
80. In Pennsylvania, the wrongful death action was created through legislation. See note
I supra See also note 5 supra
81. For Pennsylvania cases defining the presumption, see, e.g., Allison v. Snelling &
Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 861 (1967); Travis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 377 Pa. 537, 105
A.2d 131 (1954).
82. Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97, 164 A. 799, 801 (1933).
83. See Williams v. Flemington Transp. Co., 417 Pa. 26, 34, 207 A.2d 762, 766 (1965), in
which the court held that the presumption compensated for the absence of the decedent's
testimony.
proving the decedent's freedom from contributory negligence,8 4 the
presumption of due care enables the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case. 5 On the other hand, if the defendant in a wrongful death
action carries the burdens of production and persuasion to affirma-
tively establish contributory negligence,86 the procedural effect when
the presumption shifts the burden or burdens of proof becomes
meaningless.
8 7
Thus, if contributory negligence constitutes an affirmative de-
fense, the presumption of due care loses its effectiveness whether the
jurisdiction applies the Thayer doctrine, the Pennsylvania rule, or a
variation. 8 The differences among these theories focus on which
burdens shift to the opponent of a presumption. 9 Accordingly,
when both burdens already rest upon the defendant as a matter of
substantive law, the allocation of the burden of proof renders the
presumption of due care unnecessary.
III. Presumption of Due Care in Pennsylvania Jurisprudence-
An Historical Analysis
The presumption of due care has existed in Pennsylvania as an
integral part of the wrongful death action for over a century. 90 As
84. Illinois, for example, places the burden of pleading and proving the lack of contribu-
tory negligence on the plaintiff. See Sepesy v. Archer Daniels Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 384
N.E.2d 1378 (1979). Iowa previously imposed the burden of pleading and proving lack of
decedent's contributory negligence upon the plaintiff, see Ames v. Waterloo Transit Co., 120
Iowa 640, 95 N.W. 161 (1903), until the legislature shifted the burden to the defendant. See
IOWA CODE § 619.17 (Supp. 1981).
85. See Recent Decisions, Evidence--Presumptions---Statutory Presumption of Due Care
in a Wrongful Death Action, 60 MICH. L. REv. 510, 511 (1962). But see Dilliplaine v. Lehigh
Valley Trust Co., 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 249, 297 A.2d 826, 829 (1972).
86. Pennsylvania imposes both aspects of the burden of proof on the defendant. See,
e.g., Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Hagan, 47 Pa. 244 (1864).
87. When the burden of persuasion on the issue of contributory negligence rests upon the
defendant, the plaintiff may proceed without producing evidence on the issue. Thus, the pre-
sumption no longer serves a necessary role. Falknor, supra note 25, at 76.
88. One writer summarized the effect of a presumption when it operates against the party
with the burden of proof as follows:
Since a presumption is merely a rule that places the burden of producing evi-
dence, it cannot operate against the person who already has that burden ...
The same thing is true even if the court is operating under a rule that a presump-
tion shifts or effects the burden of persuasion. If both the burden of coming forward
with evidence and the burden of persuasion are already on the opponent of the pre-
sumptions, a presumption can be of no value to the proponent if not mentioned to the
jury.
Gausewitz, supra note 39, at 339.
89. See generally, Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 25; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 52; J. WIGMORE, supra note 25.
90. Bernstein, The Presumption of Due Care in Pennsylvania (,4 Reply), 31 PA. B.A.Q. 21,
27 (1959). The presumption of due care originated as an attempt to aid the many plaintiffs
whose decedents died as the result of railroad accidents. One court suggested that the pre-
sumption served "to offset the difficult task of rebutting any inference of contributory negli-
gence which could be drawn solely from the occurrence of the accident." Dilliplaine v. Lehigh
Valley Trust Co., 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 249, 297 A.2d 826, 828 (1972).
early as 1864, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the pre-
sumption when the court affirmed the following point for charge:
If the whistle of the engine was not sounded, nor any other usual
notice given of the approach of the train, the deceased had a right
to presume that the track was clear, and unless the jury are satis-
fied by affirmative proof that the deceased did not use ordinala
care, the defendants are liable for the consequences of his injury.
Subsequent to the 1864 decision, two significant cases strength-
ened the presumption.92 In Allen v. Willard,9" the court stated,
"[Tihe natural instinct which leads men in their sober senses to avoid
injury and preserve life, is an element ofevidence. 94 Two years later
the court maintained, "[T]he love of life and instinct of preservation
is the . . . highest motive for care . . . and will stand for proof of
care until the contrary appears."95
While the above cases implicitly recognize the presumption of
due care, the modem form of the due care presumption appeared
explicitly in an 1874 decision: "The common law presumption is,
that every one does his duty until the contrary is proved; and, in the
absence of all evidence on the subject, the presumption is, that the
decedent observed the precautions which the law prescribes, before
he attempted to cross the defendant's road."96 Thus, in 1874, only
thirteen years after the legislature passed the wrongful death legisla-
tion,97 the presumption of due care was firmly established. Courts
rationalized the creation of the presumption by basing it on the
probability that man's immeasurable love for life and instincts of self
preservation would compel him to exercise due care98 to avoid
91. Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Hagan, 47 Pa. 244, 245-46 (1864).
92. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a summation of the presumption of
due care in Pennsylvania, referred to cases following Philadelphia & Trenton A A Co. as in-
creasingly encrusting on the presumption of due care the attribute of evidentiary value. Klink
v. Harrison, 332 F.2d 219, 227 (3d Cir. 1964).
93. 57 Pa. 374 (1868). This case did not arise from a railroad accident, but from a fall by
the decedent into a deep excavation made by the defendants. According to the court, the
presumption represented evidence which coupled with evidence of the decedent's sober and
correct habits, proved the improbability that the decedent reeled into the excavation while he
was intoxicated.
94. Id at 380 (emphasis added).
95. Cleveland & Pitt. R.R. v. Rowan, 66 Pa. 393, 399 (1870) (emphasis added).
96. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Weber, 76 Pa. 157 (1874). In a later case, after reciting the
presumption of due care, the court stated, "The onus of proving contributory negligence was
thus clearly cast upon the defendants." Weiss v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 Pa. 387, 390 (1875).
97. The Pennsylvania Legislature created a wrongful death action in the Act of April 15,
1851, P.L. No. 669, § 19. See note 1 supra.
98. Courts have vividly described the concept of due care to encompass every move of
the decedent. See, e.g., Travis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 377 Pa. 537, 105 A.2d 131 (1954), in
which the court said, "This presumption, therefore, takes Joseph Travis to the banks of the
railroad with an awareness of danger, combined with a normal prudent desire to avoid it." Id
at 542, 105 A.2d at 133. See also Weiss v. Pennsylvania R.R., 79 Pa. 387 (1875) (court pre-
sumed that the decedent approached the railroad, stopped, looked both ways, and then pro-
ceeded with caution).
death.9 9
The language in Allen v. Willard"'° referred to the instinct to
preserve life as an "element of evidence."' The court's words os-
tensibly accepted the theory that the presumption deserves eviden-
tiary weight." °2 Subsequent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, did not adopt this principle. '03 Although some later
decisions did use language that indirectly referred to the presump-
tion as evidence,1°4 Pennsylvania instead created a rule that gave the
presumption no evidentiary value, but credited the presumption with
sufficient weight to shift the burdens of production and
persuasion. 10 5
In a milestone 1934 decision, Watkins v. Prudential Insurance
Co., 'o Judge Maxey asserted that presumptions did not function as
evidence, but served as "mere guideposts indicating whence proof
must come."' 0 7 He therefore held that the trial court had incorrectly
instructed that the "so-called presumption"' 1° against suicide sup-
plied a necessary element of proof of accidental death.0 9
Judge Maxey wrote an extensive opinion on presumptions in
99. Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97, 164 A. 799, 801 (1933). An unusual expression of this
concept appeared in Keasy v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 404 Pa. 63, 170 A.2d 328 (1961).
Every rule that one can conceive which is designed to protect and preserve
human life is presumed to have been respected by the decedent because although it is
inevitable that everyone must eventually turn in his bat and glove, no one actually
wants to hasten the end of the ball game.
Id at 69, 170 A.2d at 331.
100. 57 Pa. 374 (1868).
101. Id at 380.
102. Bernstein, supra note 90, at 27 n. 18. See also note 92 supra.
103. Legal writers recognized the evolution of the Pennsylvania rule. See Bernstein, supra
note 90, at 27 n.18; Levin, supra note 25, at 12; Comment, supra note 30, at 696. See, e.g.,
Reading & Columbia R.R. v. Ritchie, 102 Pa. 425 (1883), in which the court indicated that if
the defendant introduced "affirmative, direct and credible testimony" on the subject of con-
tributory negligence, the evidence would rebut and displace the presumption. Id at 434. But
see, Klink v. Harrison, 332 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1964), in which the federal court interpreted the
early cases as consistently according evidentiary weight to the presumption of due care.
104. See, e.g., Gojkovic v. Wageley, 278 Pa. 488, 490, 123 A. 466, 467 (1924) (rebuttable
presumptions of liability given the force of direct evidence).
105. Wickersham & Erb, ProceduralEffect of Presumption ofDue Care, 30 PA. B.A.Q. 208,
211 (1959); Levin, supra note 25, at 12. See note 103 supra.
106. 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934). Watkins played an important role in Pennsylvania
law and is frequently cited for innumerable propositions regarding presumptions. See Note,
The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions in Pennsylvania, 57 DICK. L. REV. 234, 240 (1952). See
also Wickersham and Erb, supra note 105, at 215. Wickersham and Erb concluded "that
under the present status of the law, presumptions and inferences must give way to actual
facts." Id
107. In Watkins, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy brought suit against the defend-
ant insurance company to compel payment of a sum conditioned upon death through "exter-
nal, violent and accidental means." The insured had died from inhaling carbon monoxide.
Plaintiff successfully argued that the presumption against suicide shifted both burdens of
proof. The supreme court reversed.
108. Judge Maxey, who referred to the presumption against suicide as a "so-called pre-
sumption" throughout his opinion, asserted that "the trial court erred in giving to the so-called
presumption against suicide the weight of a probative fact." 315 Pa. at 500, 173 A. at 646. His
qualification ultimately weakened the precedential value of the case. See note 113 infra
109. 315 Pa. at 499, 173 A. at 646.
* general, alluded specifically to the presumption of due care,"' and
made two conclusions. First, a presumption disappears upon intro-
duction of contradictory evidence, and second, the inference or
probability that underlies a presumption remains for jury considera-
tion." Although the opinion purported to accept the Thayer doc-
trine for all presumptions, an element of doubt prevailed because the
narrow rule l" 2 of the case concerned only a "so-called" presump-
tion."t 3  The intended effect on the presumption of due care
presented considerable uncertainty because of Judge Maxey's opin-
ion only one year earlier, in Morin v. Kreid, 114 in which he deter-
mined that the defendant had produced no evidence to "conclusively
overcome""t 5 the presumption of due care. Furthermore, Judge
Maxey modified his rule in a later opinion to allow the jury to deter-
mine if the evidence sufficiently rebuts a presumption." 1
6
Uncertainty concerning the presumption of due care persists.'
Courts purport to apply the Thayer doctrine,"' although adherence
to the Thayer doctrine requires that presumptions of due care disap-
pear when the defendant introduces contrary evidence. " 9 Neverthe-
less, in Williams v. Femington Transportation Co., 120 the court
submitted the presumption of due care to the jury after the defend-
110. In dicta, Judge Maxey concluded that the presumption of due care developed for two
reasons-to serve as a procedural expedient and to reflect a conclusion based upon the gener-
ally known results of wide human experience. Id at 505, 173 A. at 648.
Ill. Id at 512, 173 A. at 651.
112. Judge Maxey ruled only that the presumption against suicide could not take the place
of evidence. Note, supra note 106, at 241.
113. One writer hinted that the reference to the presumption as a "so-called presumption"
did not happen accidentally.
It is significant that the Watkins opinion contains no serious evaluation of the proce-
dural consequences which might result from a genuine presumption. This lack in
what is otherwise an erudite, well-documented discussion lends further force to the
conclusion that Mr. Justice Maxey had no intention at that time of changing the
Pennsylvania laws as regards presumption generally.
Levin, supra note 25, at 14.
114. 310 Pa. 90, 164 A. 799 (1933).
115. Id at 97, 164 A. 801.
116. Judge Maxey wrote that upon the establishment of certain facts, a presumption of
negligence arose and shifted the burden to defendant to show the use of care. "The presump-
tion of negligence continued to stand, however, until overcome by proof offered by the defend-
ant, and whether or not it met that requirement was for the jury to say." MacDonald v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 564-65,36 A.2d 492,495 (1944). See Comment, supra note 30,
at 699-700.
117. One writer discerned three different theories that existed in Pennsylvania. First, since
Judge Maxey never actually repudiated the Pennsylvania rule, some courts still follow that
theory. Second, certain courts have followed Judge Maxey's modified rule. Third, the federal
courts have followed Judge Maxey's purported rule in Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa.
497, 173 A. 644 (1934). See Comment, supra note 30, at 700-02.
118. See Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 435 A.2d 226 (1981). The court recog-
nized the sole function of the presumption as placing the burden of producing evidence of the
decedent's negligence on the party asserting contributory negligence. Id at 229. See also Al-
lison v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 861 (1967).
119. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
120. 417 Pa. 26, 207 A.2d 762 (1965).
ant introduced evidence to prove the decedent's excessive speed.' 12
This inconsistency in Pennsylvania models the inconsistent ap-
plication of the presumption of due care by courts of many jurisdic-
tions. 122  Specifically, courts voice adherence to the Thayer
doctrine, 123 yet apply variations that incorporate the presumption of
due care into jury instructions. 124 Consequently, the decisions are so
discordant that any theory on the function of the presumption finds
support in the case law.'25
IV. The Presumption of Due Care-Potential Inequities
A. Prejudicial Burden on the Defendant
1. Watkins' Erroneous Analysis. -Since the adoption of the
presumption of due care, Pennsylvania courts have disagreed on the
nature of the burden the presumption places upon the defendant.
126
In Watkins, 127 the supreme court joined a few other states' courts
128
in recognizing that the presumption of due care serves no procedural
purpose since the burdens of production and persuasion already rest
upon the defendant on the issue of contributory negligence. Accord-
ing to this view, instruction on the presumption imposes no greater
or lesser burden on the defendant than instruction on the burden of
proof.129 One court analogized the jury instruction on the presump-
tion of due care to "a handkerchief thrown over something already
covered by a blanket."' 30 Furthermore, casting the burden of proof
on the defendant benefits the plaintiff more than the presumption
possibly could.' 3 '
121. To rebut the presumption of due care, the defendant introduced evidence of heavy
skidmarks and extensive damage to a heavily laden truck, which the decedent's vehicle had
pushed uphill over forty feet when it crashed into the truck. Id
122. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra.
123. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
124. Williams v. Flemington Transp. Co., 417 Pa. 26, 207 A.2d 762 (1965). See also
Gausewitz, supra note 39, at 336-38 (describing this as a common variation of the Thayer
doctrine).
125. Comment, upra note 30, at 702.
126. Klink v. Harrison, 332 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1964); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust
Co., 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 297 A.2d 826 (1972) (per curiam) (concurring opinion); Cf. Rich-
mond v. A.F. of L. Medical Serv. Plan, 421 Pa. 269, 218 A.2d 303 (1966) (presumption against
the negligence of a physician in treating a patient). Put see Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super.
Ct. -, 435 A.2d 226 (1981).
127. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A.2d 644 (1934). See note 115 supra.
128. E.g., Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 194, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (1934) (concurring
opinion) (referring to presumption of due care). Cf. Board of Water Comm'rs of New London
v. Robbins & Potter, 82 Conn. 623, 640, 74 A. 938, 945 (1910) (referring to presumption against
fraud by a public official); Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 563 (1870) (referring to the pre-
sumption of emancipation).
129. Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 194, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (1934); See also Board of
Water Comm'rs of New London v. Robbins & Potter, 82 Conn. 623, 74 A. 938 (1910).
130. Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 194, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (1934).
131. Id Judge Lummus further proposed that if the presumption of due care were abol-
ished, "neither party would be a whit the better or worse." Id
The Watkins opinion simultaneously maintained that instruc-
tions on the presumption of due care merely reiterate burden of
proof instructions and purportedly adopted the Thayer doctrine for
all presumptions. 32 The two views are irreconcilable. Under the
pure Thayer doctrine, 33 however, the presumption operates to place
upon the defendant only the burden of producing sufficient evidence
to justify a finding of contributory negligence. 34 The presumption
serves as a guide to the judge in passing upon a motion for a plain-
tiff's directed verdict. 35 Once the defendant offers sufficient evi-
dence to avoid a directed verdict, the case proceeds as if the
presumption never existed 3s and the jury never hears instructions
on the presumption of due care. 37 Thus, under true Thayer theory,
the presumption does not reiterate the burden of proof.' 38 Accord-
ingly, the Watkins analysis is erroneous. Nevertheless, since most
Pennsylvania courts do not apply the pure Thayer doctrine 39 and
juries are instructed on the presumption, the effect of the presump-
tion merits discussion.
2 Effect of the Instruction on the Jury. -The view expressed in
Watkins that the presumption merely reiterates the burden of proof
overlooks the benefit conferred on the plaintiff by that instruction on
the presumption of due care."a By instructing the jury that the de-
fendant bears the burden of proving contributory negligence by a
preponderance of evidence, the court merely states the defendant's
duty. Instructing the jury to assume that the decedent exercised due
care, however, places the plaintiff on a different, more advantageous
footing.' 4 ' The instruction on the presumption constitutes a separate
132. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A.2d 644 (1934). See notes 106-12
and accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra for a discussion on Judge Maxey's
attempt to adopt the Thayer doctrine.
134. Morgan, supra note 10, at 260.
135. Id
136. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 52.
137. Id Cf. Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 60 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1930)
(presumption of bailee's fault when damaged goods returned to bailor). Judge Learned Hand
maintained, "If a trial is properly conducted, the presumption will not be mentioned at all."
Id at 736.
138. Federal courts interpreting Pennsylvania law often apply the Thayer doctrine, which
the state courts purport to follow. Comment, supra note 30, at 702. See, e.g., Johnstone v.
Reading Co., 248 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1957). The Johnstone court held that the testimony of the
fireman of defendant's locomotive, the only eyewitness, conclusively overcame the presump-
tion of due care. The court of appeals affirmed the refusal of the trial court to instruct on the
presumption without requiring the evidence to be credible.
139. Comment, supra note 30, at 699-702. See also notes 117-25 and accompanying text
supra.
140. See Richmond v. A.F. of L. Medical Serv. Plan, 421 Pa. 272, 218 A.2d 303 (1966)
(presumption against the negligence of a physician). See also notes 146 & 147 and accompa-
nying text infra
141. Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935). In Worth, a daughter-in-law sued
her parents-in-law for alienation of her husband's affections. The trial court refused to instruct
instruction and consequently impresses a distinct thought upon the
jury. Pennsylvania courts, however, have not explicitly recognized
this additional burden. 142 Without an express determination that the
burden should be increased, its imposition is hard to justify. '
4 3
Nevertheless, some Pennsylvania courts have criticized the ef-
fects of the presumption of due care. For example, in Dilliplaine v.
Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 44 the decedent-defendant died of causes
unrelated to the accident from which the suit arose. The lower court
instructed the jury that the decedent was presumed to have exercised
due care, and denied plaintiff's request for new trial. The supreme
court affirmed per curiam. Judge Hoffman, however, in a concurring
opinion, recognized that the presumption "added nothing to a jury's
ability to intelligently and impartially decide a case. Instead the
charge may befuddle the issue should the jury misunderstand the
weight to be given the presumption."'
' 45
Similarly, in Richmond v. A4.F of L. Medical Service Plan, 146 the
supreme court determined that the presumption against a doctor's
negligence, analogous to the presumption of due care because it also
operates against the party with the burden of proof, gave the impres-
sion that the plaintiffs were required to go beyond proving a prima
facie case of negligence. 147 The court held that the jury instruction
on the presumption of a parent's good faith and proper motives in counseling a child. This
presumption, like the presumption of due care, operated against the party with the burden of
proof. The supreme court held that the request for the instructions was improperly refused.
The court succinctly discussed the effect of the burden.
It is not, we think, quite correct to say that the presumption only reiterates the burden
of proof. An instruction that the burden to prove malice is on the plaintiff states the
duty resting on the latter. An instruction that the jury must start out with the as-
sumption that the defendants were in good faith states a benefit or privilege conferred
upon the defendant by law. It at least makes the benefit clear and brings it home to
the jury which, after all, is the one important point in a jury trial. It is, in fact, a
distinct thought which, particularly if pressed home to the jury by counsel, may often
be of value.. .. The instruction on the burden of proof given herein was the ordi-
nary instruction on the subject. It put the case on the exact level of any other case.
But the law puts it on a different level
Id at -, 49 P.2d at 656.
It has been suggested that the court's decision represented a policy decision to increase the
burden of proving alienation of affections. Nevertheless, if the circumstances indicated the
propriety of requiring an increased burden, the court should specify the additional amount to
the jury. Falknor, supra note 25, at 81.
142. Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super Ct. -, 435 A.2d 226 (1981), illustrates that Penn-
sylvania courts still require only a preponderance of evidence. The court stated that the pre-
sumption was only the converse of the burden of proof, and therefore explicit burden of proof
instructions would suffice. Throughout the opinion, the court showed no inclination to raise
the defendant's burden of proof.
143. Falknor, supra note 25, at 82.
144. 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 297 A.2d 826 (1972).
145. Id at 247-48, 297 A.2d at 827 (Hoffman, J., concurring).
146. 421 Pa. 269, 218 A.2d 303 (1966).
147. Id at 271, 218 A.2d at 304. The court also noted, "There is a distinct and important
difference between stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the negligence asserted,
and that the defendant physician is presumed to be free from negligence." Id This statement
directly contradicts the dicta in Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 496, 173 A. 644 (1934),
which stated that the presumption was the mere converse of the burden of proof.
on the presumption produced prejudicial error, and ordered a new
trial. 14
8
The Minnesota Supreme Court, unlike the Pennsylvania court,
has discussed the instruction on the presumption of due care and its
ultimate effect on defendant's burden in a wrongful death action.'49
The court determined that the sole effect of the instruction was to
suggest to the jury that it could decide the issue against the defend-
ant even if the defendant proved contributory negligence by a pre-
ponderance.' 50 Applying this rationale, which parallels the
Pennsylvania court's rationale in Richmond, the court ultimately
held that instruction on the presumption of due care constituted
error.
15 1
Despite varied opinions on the actual effect of the presumption
of due care, Pennsylvania courts perpetuate a long-established prac-
tice of instruction on the presumption. 52 A court may instruct that
the defendant must prove contributory negligence by a preponder-
ance of evidence and that the presumption of due care exists until
rebutted by a preponderance of evidence. 53 The second instruction
does not merely reiterate the first instruction; rather, it impresses the
due care issue more firmly in the jurors' minds and may increase the
defendant's burden immeasurably. 54 Regarding the extent of that
burden, one court suggested that assigning the burden of proof to
one party and benefiting the other party with a legal presumption
148. 421 Pa. at 270, 218 A.2d at 304.
149. TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
150. Id at -, 53 N.W.2d at 473. One writer viewed this Minnesota decision as a "step
toward total abolition of any remnants of the confusing due care presumption." Recent Deci-
sions, supra note 85, at 512. This abolition was temporarily thwarted, however, by the Minne-
sota legislature, and only recently concluded by the courts.
151. TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
152. Levin, supra nott 24, at 28.
153. Eg., Green v. Parisi, 478 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1973), in which the court gave the follow-
ing instruction:
I advise you, however, that both the possible defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk are what are known as affirmative defenses and as such the de-
fendant has the burden of proof on those issues. That is the defendant or defendants
asserting such a defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [the
decedent] himself was contributorily negligent, as I have defined this term to you, or
being aware of the risk of harm, voluntarily assumed the risk of harm, and that such
contributory negligence or assumption of the risk contributed to the happening of the
accident in a proximate way.
I further advise you that there is a presumption in law that a decedent was using
due care at the time of his death and that he did not negligently or voluntarily bring
about his own death, and that he took all normal and reasonable precautions to pro-
tect and preserve his life. Thus in the absence of substantive evidence to the contrary
which overcomes by a preponderance of evidence the presumption that the decedent
was not contributorily negligent, this presumption would prevail and you would be
justified in finding that the decedent was not contributorily negligent and that he did
not voluntarily assume the risk of harm.
Id. at 315. The instruction on assumption of risk was appropriate because defendant con-
tended that the decedent had lighted a match near a gas leak.
154. See note 60 and accompanying text supra
amounted to "a double and unjust use of one and the same thing."'' 5 5
The presumption of due care would not increase the defendant's
burden if the jury clearly understood the role of the presumption.
156
Courts encounter difficulty, however, in conveying to the jury the
meaning, duration, and rebuttal of the presumption. 57 In part, this
may stem from the court's own uncertainty concerning duration and
adequate rebuttal. 58 Nevertheless, juries proceed through a certain
routine; jury members weigh and sort the evidence and ultimately
arrive at a decision. To supplement this procedure with a rebuttable
presumption only confuses the jury and skews the process. 59 Juries
may interpret "the law presumes" as a conclusive and irrebuttable
statement that the defendant cannot overcome.' 6 ° The Minnesota
court recognized this potential to misconstrue the presumption when
it suggested that the presumption allowed the jury to find against the
defendant despite conclusive evidence of contributory negligence.'
6'
Instruction on the strong 1robability that the decedent exercised
due care will not reduce the confusion and resulting prejudice.'
62
The law cannot assign the degree of probability.' 63 Therefore, the
jury may initially establish the probability of the decedent's due care
so high that the defendant cannot realistically overcome that
probability. '"
B. Interaction with Comparative Negligence
In Pennsylvania, which has adopted comparative negligence, a
decedent's contributory negligence no longer bars plaintiff's recovery
if the decedent's negligence did not constitute the greater cause of
the accident.' 65 Consequently, the superior court has recently sug-
gested that the plaintiff no longer needs the benefit of the presump-
155. Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 563 (1870).
156. One writer linked the confusion in the area of presumptions to the difficulty in phras-
ing the notion of presumptions to a jury. McCormick, supra note 25, at 189.
157. Falknor, supra note 25, at 82.
158. See generally note 28 and accompanying text supra
159. Id
160. McCormick, supra note 25, at 189.
161. TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
162. McBaine, supra note 25, at 547.
163. One commentator asserts that the degree of probability cannot be fixed by "any con-
ceivable process of the human mind." Id at 548.
164. Id
165. The Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute provides, in part, the following:
(a) General rule-In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence result-
ing in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal
representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of
the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1981).
tion of due care.1 66 Unfortunately, the court did not discuss what
effect the continued use of the presumption would cast on the jury's
apportionment of negligence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, discussed the interac-
tion of the presumption of due care with the Minnesota comparative
negligence statute, 167 and held that the statutory presumption of due
care 61 leads the jury to cast a greater percentage of negligence upon
the defendant, despite evidence to the contrary. 69 Since the total
apportionment of negligence must equal one hundred percent, any
increase in the defendant's negligence results in a symmetrical de-
crease in the decedent's negligence. 7 Thus, informing a jury of the
presumption of due care substantially alters the process by which the
jury allocates negligence.171 One method to prevent the presumption
from harming the defendant is to require the jury to follow a two-
step process in determining comparative negligence. 72 The pre-
sumption of due care would arise only when the jury determined
whether the decedent acted negligently. 73 After initially finding a
decedent negligent, the jury would then not receive instruction on
the presumption when determining the proportion of the decedent's
negligence.' 74 The potential that the lingering impression of the ini-
tial instruction would have an effect on the jury's thought process
makes this a dubious solution.
75
Furthermore, this rationale, which risks the possibility of ad-
verse effects on the jury's verdict, serves no purpose because the de-
cedent's contributory negligence will not completely bar a plaintiff's
recovery.' 76 The doctrine of comparative negligence developed to
obviate the harshness of contributory negligence. 7 7 The presump-
tion of due care evolved for the same reason.17 8 In a wrongful death
166. "In today's trials, particularly since the statutory enactment ofprinciples of comparative
negligence, an instruction that there is a separate presumption of due care which arises from
the fact of death can only serve to confuse the jury and becloud the issue." Yandrich v. Radic,
- Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 435 A.2d 226, 230 (1981) (emphasis added).
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1981).
168. Prior to 1978, Minnesota wrongful death legislation provided that "the jury shall be
instructed of the existence of such presumption, and shall determine whether the presumption
is rebutted by the evidence." Id § 602.04, repealed by laws 1978, c. 491, § 1; laws 1978, c. 674,
§46.
169. Price v. Amdal, - Minn. -, 256 N.W. 2d 461 (1977).
170. Id
171. Case Comment, Evidence.: Statutory Presumption of a Decedent's Due Care Denies
Equal Protection to Survivors Suedfor Wrongful Death, 62 MINN. L. REV. 467, 476 (1977).
172. Id
173. Id
174. Discussing the two-step procedure of a jury's verdict, a commentator stated that
"there is little to suggest that an instruction on the presumption will in any way affect the
allocation of negligence." Id
175. Price v. Amdal, - Minn. -, -- 256 N.W.2d 461, 468 (1977).
176. See note 166 supra. See also Price v. Amdal, - Minn. -, 256 N.W.2d 461 (1977).
177. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 469 (3d ed. 1964).
178. See note 90 supra
action, therefore, an instruction on a separate presumption of due
care needlessly confuses the jury and distorts the issues.'79
V. Resulting Quandry and Proposed Solutions
Pennsylvania courts presently find themselves in a quandry.'
80
While courts agree that the presumption does not constitute proba-
tive evidence,1 8' to reduce the presumption to a procedural device in
compliance with the Thayer doctrine,8 2 which the supreme court
has recognized as valid law,18 3 relegates the presumption to a mini-
mal, ineffective role. This minimal role directly contradicts the long-
established trial practice of application of the Pennsylvania rule or a
variation that affords the presumption a larger role. Thus, courts
ultimately give the presumption more weight than they themselves
recognize it should be given.'
8 4
The Pennsylvania judiciary has few options from which to
choose in attempting to alleviate the confusion. Pennsylvania courts
could resume treating the presumption of due care as an "element of
evidence..'8.5 This option might produce more uniformity because
the jury would always be instructed to weigh the presumption with
other evidence.' 86 Moreover, the jury probably would not interpret
the presumption as conclusive. 18 7  Nevertheless, treating the pre-
sumption as evidence may only slightly reduce confusion because of
the difficulty the jury encounters when it weighs a rule of law with
evidence.' Consequently, the instruction might effectively impose
an unreasonable and unjust burden on the defendant because the
jury could conclude the fact of due care to be true and all other facts
false.' 89 Furthermore, the option may only intensify the quandry be-
cause it conflicts with the courts' accepted theories concerning
179. Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 435 A.2d 226, 230 (1981).
180. See notes 117-25 and accompanying text supra
181. Eg., Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 435 A.2d 226 (1981); Allison v. Snelling
& Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 229 A.2d 861 (1967); Richmond v. A.F. of L. Medical Serv. Plan,
421 Pa. 269, 218 A.2d 303 (1966); Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644
(1934).
182. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
183. See Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 435 A.2d 226, 229 (1981).
184. See notes 90-125 and accompanying text supra.
185. Willard v. Allen, 57 Pa. 374, 380 (1868). Before Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co, 315
Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934), the court occasionally accorded evidentiary weight to the presump-
tion. See notes 102 & 104 and accompanying text supra.
186. Treating the presumption as evidence would simplify the jury instructions to provide
that "if the jury found the basic fact, the presumption would arise and would be evidence of
the existence of the presumed fact." E. MORGAN, supra note 65, at 43.
187. McCormick, supra note 25, at 189.
188. "To tell a jury to weigh a rule of law is to command them to do the impossible--to
imply sophistry of the rankest kind. Further, such an instruction is highly unfair to a defend-
ant because the jury may give the legal presumption any weight they so desire." McBaine,
supra note 25, at 544-45.
189. Id at 547. The writer concluded, "If we regard the presumption as the equivalent of
evidence, the result is shocking." Id
presumptions.' 90
A second option, strict adherence to the Thayer doctrine, would
withhold the presumption from jury instructions' 9' and thus elimi-
nate the prejudice stemming from the jury's incorrect perception of
the defendant's burden. 192 The supreme court previously purported
to accept this theory, 193 however, and did not strictly apply it.1
94
Thus, the courts' hesitation to remove the presumption upon intro-
duction of contrary evidence continues to impede implementation of
the Thayer doctrine. 195
As a third option, Pennsylvania could abolish the presumption
of due care and avoid the resultant confusion and prejudice.' 96
Since the defendant must prove contributory negligence by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, clear concise jury instructions explaining
the defendant's burden of proof will suffice.' 97 This option, while
not novel, offers a simple, decisive remedy. 98 The difficulty of fram-
ing proper instructions on presumptions and the comparative ease of
instructing juries on the burden of proof enhance the advisability of
abolishing the presumption. 199
Several safeguards would protect the plaintiff who loses the ben-
190. See note 181 and accompanying text supra. See also McCormick, supra note 25, at"
189.
191. Commentators agree the presumption should not be included in jury instructions. J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 52, at § 300[011. A court applying the Thayer doctrine
will not mention the presumption to the jury. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text supra.
192. The prejudicial burden results from the jury's distorted perception of the defendant's
burden. See notes 140-50 and accompanying text supra.
193. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 646 (1934).
194. See generally 106-21 and accompanying text supra
195. The courts' hesitation might be rooted in a general recognition that if the presump-
tion were worth creating, to dispose of it so easily would be reckless and ridiculous. Morgan,
supra note 25, at 82.
196. Pennsylvania would not act rashly by abolishing the presumption. One writer advo-
cated abolition of the presumption of due care in Washington jurisprudence in 1940 and ad-
ded, "even at this late date." Falknor, supra note 25, at 74. The Washington court, quoting
large portions of Falknor's article, abolished the presumption of due care in 1953. Hutton v.
Martin, 41 Wash. 2d 780, -, 252 P.2d 581, 587 (1953). Similarly, two Pennsylvania writers
advocated in 1959 that the presumption of due care should "give way." Wickersham & Erb,
supra, note 105, at 215. Sufficient time has passed, yet the uncertainty and confusion prevail.
See notes 117-25 and accompanying text supra
197. The superior court has recognized the adequacy of burden of proof instructions: "It
is enough that a jury may be instructed properly and adequately regarding the burdens of
proving negligence and contributory negligence." Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -,
435 A.2d 226, 230 (1981). Courts that consider the presumption to merely reiterate the burden
of proof would easily accept this solution because if the courts abolish the presumption neither
party would be "any whit worse." Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 194, 189 N.E. 41, 43
(1943).
198. Other jurisdictions have already abolished the presumption of due care. See, e.g.,
Jurman v. Braen, Inc., 47 N.J. 586, 222 A.2d 78 (1966); Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wash. 2d 780, 252
P.2d 581 (1953).
199. After abolishing the presumption of due care, the jury would only receive instruc-
tions that the burden of establishing contributory negligence by a fair preponderance of evi-
dence rests upon the defendant. This instruction, together with the usual advice that jurors are
the sole judges of the evidence and of the credibility of witnesses, would meet the necessities of
the wrongful death action. Falknor, supra note 25, at 85.
efit of the presumption of due care. First, the existing burden of
proof will mandate a directed verdict against the defendant who fails
to produce a preponderance of evidence on the issue of contributory
negligence. 2" Second, the underlying probability that a person will
normally avoid death remains imbedded in human nature and there-
fore persists as a key ingredient in the jury system.20  Third, plain-
tilts counsel can remind the jury in closing argument that the
decedent cannot speak for himself.2 2 These safeguards may not
confer the entire benefit of the presumption of due care, but they
address the problem of the decedent's silence without invoking
prejudice and confusion.20 a
VI. Conclusion
The presumption of due care in Pennsylvania no longer serves a
useful purpose, yet anomalously imposes a prejudicial burden on the
defendant. Recently, courts have conceded that the presumption
should be deemed valueless.2' Abolition of the presumption of due
care in Pennsylvania would simplify a historically complex area and,
more importantly, would allow the jury to focus on the actual evi-
dence of a decedent's due care.
DONNA L. FISHER
200. Case Comment, supra note 171, at 481.
201. In Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934), Judge Maxey rec-
ognized that the natural probability or inference on which a presumption is based remains
after a presumption vanishes.
202. Case Comment, supra note 171, at 481.
203. Id
204. See, e.g., Yandrich v. Radic, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 435 A.2d 226 (1981).

